The EU regulation 1606/2002 enhances the financial statement comparability by requiring the IFRS mandatory application. In Italy, the implementation of EU regulation states that listed firms are required to prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS, then extended to private firms on a voluntary basis. The study aims to examine the influence of some firm-specific characteristics on voluntary IFRS adoption by analysing a selected sample of Italian private firms over 2006-2010. The results show that firms are more likely to adopt IFRS in their separate financial statements if there is the presence of ownership diffusion and a Big-4 along with greater profitability. Such adoption is not influenced by whether firms register a high level of capital intensity and leverage, and it does not increase with the firm size or level of foreign sales. Our findings may also represent a primary approach to investigate whether IFRS adoption could be beneficial for SMEs, as a large part of sampled firms may be classified according to the EU definition of SME.
Introduction
Continuous economic development and globalisation have generated an increase of business transactions, which calls for a steady adaptation of accounting standards and the harmonisation of financial reports in order to compare different national accounting systems. Comparing financial information across countries is problematic, as this implies the knowledge of different sets of GAAP (Murphy, 1999) . Therefore, the adoption of a single set of accounting standards worldwide seems to provide a uniform language for financial reporting.
PwC (2011) highlights several opportunities in applying IFRS. They are accounting-based choices, which allow firms to change the valuation of certain asset positions and their financial structure when examined by international rating agencies, or just for avoiding the preparation of two types of financial statements according to both local GAAP and IFRS as part of a group. Firms may also be willing to switch to IFRS for strategic or comparing reasons, such as a better access to financial markets, acquisitions of foreign firms, the capture of potential external investors or international growth opportunities of a business.
Previous literature finds IFRS to be beneficial to private firms. The use of IFRS improves comparability of firms since national accounting standards differ in recognition and valuation requirements, and the increased comparability enhances transparency in the decision-making process of investors and stakeholders (Raffournier, 2013; Ball, 2016) . This facilitates the contracting with external parties (Francis et al., 2008) and solves agency conflicts with external shareholders (Eierle and Haller, 2009) , as both external parties and shareholders rely on higher quality financial information in order to get better insights into firm performance. However, some studies find IFRS to be less appropriate for private firms. IFRS application is less justified in code-law countries, as the primary capital providers are financial institutions not requiring additional disclosure (Page, 1984) . Further, the differences in the taxation law system between IFRS and non-IFRS adopters may create strong incentives against the voluntary IFRS adoption (Nobes, 2008 (Nobes, , 2011 . Firms applying a new set of accounting standards face high adoption and switching costs (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007) . Therefore, voluntary private IFRS adopters may weight benefits and costs by expecting that benefits of applying IFRS exceed the related costs.
Italy is a code-law country with a conservative accounting system. The reasons for its classification refer to the purpose of financial reporting that satisfies the information needs of creditors, the strong alignment between financial reporting and taxation, and banks as mainly suppliers of firms' debt (Nobes and Parker, 2012) . Such peculiarities imply several differences between Italian GAAP and IFRS, which support the findings of some empirical studies showing that IFRS mandatory transition caused a strong change due to the differences between the two sets of accounting standards (Cordazzo, 2013) .
In Italy, the Legislative Decree 38/05 implements the requirements of the EU regulation 1606/2002. The Decree states that listed firms are required to prepare their separate and consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRS. Private firms may voluntarily apply IFRS on both separate and consolidated accounts. They are firms under control of listed firms, banks, financial intermediaries or insurance firms as well as other firms, which either prepare consolidated financial statements or are under the control of firms preparing consolidated financial statements (OIC, 2005) . Further, IFRS are voluntarily applicable to separate financial statements of private firms that are not required to prepare consolidated financial statements, only if their controlling entity presents IFRS consolidated. Private firms that prepare separate accounts and are not under the control of a firm do not apply IFRS.
Given these premises, our study aims to assess the voluntary IFRS adoption in Italy by analysing the influence of some firm-specific characteristics on this adoption. The analysis uses data over 2006-2010 of a selected sample of Italian private firms. The interest of focusing on private firms is based on the existence of a large percentage of SMEs in Europe (99%), as well as the recognition of their economic power and role as job providers, and incorporation of a large innovation potential (European Commission, 2009) . In Italy, private firms are a quite large number and considered as a strong component of Italian economy. Being proved that the effect of IFRS transition is particularly marked due to the distance between Italian GAAP and IFRS (Bae et al., 2008) , this could be reassessed in our study with reference to Italian private firms by investigating what firm-specific factors influence such an transition.
In previous literature, several firm-specific characteristics under different circumstances are identified as being important with respect to firms' accounting standards choice, in particular in explaining voluntary IFRS adoption (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; Francis et al., 2008; Orens et al., 2010; Bessieux-Ollier and Walliser, 2012; André et al., 2013) . The selection of firm-specific determinants denoting the characteristics of sampled Italian private firms is grounded on the assumptions of such previous studies. Our findings show that Italian private firms are more likely to adopt IFRS if there is the presence of ownership diffusion and a Big-4 along with greater profitability. This accounting choice is not influenced by whether firms register a high level of capital intensity and leverage, and it does not increase with the firm size or level of foreign sales.
The paper could provide a valuable contribution to the existing literature on the voluntary IFRS choice and its association with firm-specific determinants, which is scarce for supporting the debate among policy makers and standard setters about the importance of IFRS application for unlisted firms (André et al., 2013) . Further, it extends the limited prior research that, to our knowledge, investigates this issue with reference to the Italian accounting setting (Cameran and Campa, 2010; Matonti and Iuliano, 2012) . On the other hand, the findings of this paper are of direct relevance to Italian accounting regulators assessing what types of firms will adopt voluntarily IFRS. Knowledge of the characteristics of these firms would indicate what factors matter in the voluntary IFRS adoption decision. These factors may be a first attempt at demonstrating the role of some firm-specific determinants in influencing the potential future compliance to IFRS for SMEs. Indeed, IFRS for SMEs are de facto not applicable in Italy, even though it is arguable that its implementation could be also a future choice (PwC, 2011) .
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains the relevant research literature and the development of hypotheses. The research methodology and results appear in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Research literature and hypotheses development
Previous literature evidences the role of financial reporting as an important mechanism for resolving market imperfections (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990) . However, this role depends on the quality of financial reporting, which is achieved by IFRS convergence increasing disclosure and adoption of more internationally accepted accounting practices, assisting in reducing a significant amount of risk in foreign investment and eliminating a major source of uncertainty associated with the comparison of financial statements between countries.
Prior research supports the assumption that IFRS application yields financial reports of higher quality. Some studies focus on the advantage of more standardised IFRS information, if national accounting standards require a lower disclosure level and confer more accounting policy choices (Ashbaugh, 2001) . Other studies compare the higher quality of IFRS-based financial statements in the post-and in the pre-IFRS mandatory transition (Barth et al., 2008) . Other research investigates how IFRS application reduces earnings management and controls opportunistic management behaviour (Chen et al., 2010) . In Italy, there exists little evidence on accounting quality, demonstrating the value relevance of equity and earnings according to IFRS rather than Italian GAAP (Paglietti, 2009) , or proving that the decrease of earnings management under IFRS is closely related to specific firm incentives (Cameran et al., 2014) .
Given these premises on accounting quality, some studies investigate the influence on the firm-specific characteristics of listed firms on the voluntary IFRS adoption. Their results show that listing status and internationality are significant factors influencing the voluntary IFRS adoption, while size, leverage, capital intensity, profitability, ownership structure and audit firms do not always affect IFRS application decision (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998; Murphy, 1999) . Other prior research investigates the influence of country-specific characteristics on voluntary IFRS adoption. Some studies prove that in common-law countries firms provide a higher level of financial disclosure compared to those in code-law countries, because of the influence of cultural values (Jaggi and Low, 2000) . Others observe that larger and internationally operating firms are more likely to apply IFRS, especially where national GAAP are of lower quality and IFRS application is permitted (Tarca, 2004) .
Over the last years, previous literature focuses on the determinants of voluntary IFRS adoption by private firms trying to reinterpret the results of previous studies focusing on listed firms. Some studies prove that voluntary IFRS application depends on contracts with external parties, as IFRS reduce information asymmetry and improve accounting and financial transparency (Francis et al., 2008) . Other studies find that size, internationality, foreign shareholders, ownership concentration, Big-4 enhance compliance with IFRS, while leverage and capital intensity are not always significant drivers in the IFRS application (Orens et al., 2010; Cameran and Campa, 2010; Bassemir, 2012; Matonti and Iuliano, 2012; André et al., 2013) .
We address the results of these previous studies in order to select a core of firm-specific variables denoting the characteristics of sampled Italian private firms, as well as the theoretical framework at the basis of their system of hypotheses. Previous studies assume that IFRS adoption by private firms may be part of agency theory. The use of IFRS, a set of higher quality accounting standards, resolve information asymmetry and agency conflicts. Financial statements contain only publicly available accounting data for some private firms, and so they have to meet the information needs of foreign shareholders and contracts-related outside parties. Further, especially in code law countries, banks are usually the major suppliers of finance for private firms, and financial statements are the source for their decisions. This may result in agency conflicts between bankers and privately held firms. For the purpose of the study, the following firm-specific variables are selected in the formulation of hypotheses.
Firm size
Larger firms dispose of greater financial resources to implement a new set of accounting standards (Murphy, 1999; Matonti and Iuliano, 2012) . Their undertaking of contractual relationships with several parties (Fülbier and Gassen, 2010; Bassemir, 2012) and their demanding owners' information needs (Jaggi and Low, 2000) may incentive them to provide greater information by adopting IFRS (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998; Matonti and Iuliano, 2012) . In Italy, the switch to IFRS could involve higher transition costs, as the Italian accounting standards significantly differ from IFRS. These costs decrease by increasing the firm size. We hypothesise:
H1 Firm size has a positive association with voluntary IFRS adoption.
Internationality
Internationally operating firms are exposed to a wider range of more diversified stakeholders, which may demand more standardised financial statements (Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; Orens et al., 2010; André et al., 2013) . Firms characterised by a higher level of foreign sales have to contract with a broader range of foreign parties, then the IFRS application may facilitate to establish and maintain contracting relations with them (Francis et al., 2008) . We expect that Italian private firms with high level of foreign sales have more incentives to apply voluntarily IFRS. We hypothesise:
H2 Internationality has a positive association with voluntary IFRS adoption.
Ownership structure
Firms with large ownership diffusion are supposed to provide voluntarily additional information compared to those with a high ownership concentration (Bessieux-Ollier and Walliser, 2012) . High ownership diffusion implies the presence of a large number of small shareholders, and the voluntary IFRS application may facilitate their monitoring role by providing a higher disclosure level, restricting accounting policy choices and reducing costs for information collection (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998) . Private Italian firms are mainly family-owned and present a high ownership concentration (Matonti and Iuliano, 2012) . Nevertheless, we assume that if private firms have a high foreign ownership diffusion, they are more willing to adopt IFRS. We hypothesise:
H3 Ownership diffusion has a negative association with voluntary IFRS adoption.
Profitability
Firms are likely to increase their credibility in order to provide a reliable justification for their profitability (Orens et al., 2010) . Managers of unprofitable firms tend to withhold information, which generates firms' unwillingness to adopt a set of accounting standards that requires increased disclosure (Bessieux-Ollier and Walliser, 2012). Further, Matonti and Iuliano (2012) argue that even though banks are the main finance providers of Italian firms, they have also to prove their credibility and profitability towards other creditors. This implies that firms are willing to apply IFRS as they expect some benefits in increasing disclosure at additional costs. These results suggest that it is unclear whether firms are more likely to adopt IFRS when they have a high profitability or they want to increase their profitability. We hypothesise: H4 Profitability has a positive/negative association with voluntary IFRS adoption.
Leverage
IFRS adoption implies additional disclosure and greater transparency, which may reduce firms' cost of debt of highly leveraged firms (Francis et al., 2008; Orens et al., 2010) . Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that private firms communicate with their creditors and stakeholders on an 'as-needed' basis. This reduces the demand for public financial reporting quality. On the contrary, Murphy (1999) demonstrates that IFRS application yields lower benefits if firms and banks are close. Additionally, creditors of private firms need less information than those of public ones, they have long-term relations with a firm, and information acquisition and provision happens over time (Peek et al., 2010) . In Italy, banks are the main debt suppliers of Italian private firms, and their communication channels are on an 'as-needed' basis. We hypothesise:
H5 Leverage has a negative association with voluntary IFRS adoption. Francis et al. (2008) use the capital intensity as a proxy for firm's assets in place (Myers, 1977) . The study shows a positive relationship between assets in place and capital intensity, arguing that monitoring costs should be lower for firms with high assets in place than for those with large current assets. Orens et al. (2010) prove that firms with a low fixed assets (low barriers to entry) are less likely to adopt IFRS, as well as to provide a higher level of disclosure fearing to lose their competitiveness. Therefore, firms with high fixed assets belong to industries where high barriers to entry exist with a lower probability to lose their competitive position, and they are willing to provide additional information by applying IFRS. We expect that a neutral association exists between IFRS and capital intensity, as we do not consider the classification of Italian private firms on industries and their relative capital intensity. We hypothesise:
Capital intensity
H6 Capital intensity has an association with voluntary IFRS adoption.
Auditors' expertise
Big-4 auditors are supposed to perform better than non-Big-4 ones (Bassemir, 2012) . They have a comparative advantage over non-Big-4 auditors, because their expertise in switching to IFRS is quite strong, and they have better trained staff in auditing IFRS (Hail et al., 2010; Bassemir, 2012; Matonti and Iuliano, 2012) . Accordingly, the choice of a Big-4 auditor could be both a reason and a consequence of voluntary IFRS application, as they are more specialised and they belong to an international network (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998; Bassemir, 2012; André et al., 2013) . We assume that Italian private firms, which mainly have their financial statements audited by a Big-4 auditor, could be more motivated in the voluntary IFRS application. We hypothesise: H7 Auditors' expertise has a positive association with voluntary IFRS adoption.
Methodology

Sample and data collection
We examine the firm-characteristics of Italian private IFRS appliers from 2006 to 2010. The IFRS transition year is 2006. Private firms meeting the requirements for the voluntary IFRS adoption are selected and their data collected from the AIDA Database in July 2012. Firms operating in specific sectors (financial, insurance, pension funding, real estate, rental, education, public, leasing, legal and accounting sector) are excluded owing to their peculiar accounting requirements. 405 firms represent the sample of private IFRS appliers. We manually analyse their separate financial statements to control whether they are prepared according to IFRS from 2006 to 2010. After this control, 273 firms are excluded and 132 firms compose the sample.
The Italian private non-IFRS appliers are selected on two matching criteria: the ATECO-code in AIDA and the amount of revenue in 2010 of the reference matched IFRS appliers. The choice of revenues is justified as they do not mainly differ under both local GAAP and IFRS. One IFRS applier is excluded, because no matching firm is found. The final sample comprises 262 firms.
The logistic regression model
We use the binary logistic regression model to estimate the association between IFRS and the selected firm-specific characteristics influencing the voluntary IFRS application, which is widely applied in previous studies (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; Francis et al., 2008; Orens et al., 2010; Bessieux-Ollier and Walliser, 2012; André et al., 2013 
where IFRS = 1 if voluntarily IFRS-adopter, 0 otherwise; LnAssets = natural logarithm of total assets; Int = portion of foreign sales on total sales; Own diff = 1 minus the portion of known shareholders; ROE = EBIT on equity; Lev = total debt on total assets; AIP = fixed assets on total assets; Audit exp = 1 if Big-4 auditor, 0 otherwise; t = year of interest.
The dependent variable represents a firm's accounting choice, and it is equal to 1 if a firm voluntarily adopts IFRS, 0 otherwise. The total assets (Assets) is the proxy of firm size, and its natural logarithm is used for controlling hetheroschedasticity. The portion of foreign sales on total sales (Int) is the proxy for firm internationality (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998) . The ownership diffusion (Own diff) is 1 minus the portion of shares held by known shareholders (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998) . We calculate profitability as ROE = EBIT on equity, because 30% of sampled firms register a loss over 2006-2010; leverage as Lev = total debt on total assets, because we expect communication of private debt through private channels, which could evidence a greater portion of current debt on total debt. We measure the capital intensity (AIP) as fixed assets on total assets (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998) . The influence of auditor's expertise (Audit exp) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit firm is a Big-4, 0 otherwise.
We perform the regression analysis in each year of interest (1 The one sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used for testing the normal distribution of firms-specific variables. The parametric two-tailed t-test is applied on means to normally distributed variables, while the non-parametric two tailed Mann Whitney U-test on medians and the two-tailed Chi square test on dichotomous variables.
Results
Descriptive statistics
To get some insights of the differences between IFRS and non-IFRS appliers, the descriptive statistics are calculated for both samples in each year of interest over 2006-2010 (Table 1) . Notes: The t student test on means is applied to those variables denoting a normal distribution according to the K-S test. The hypothesis is significant at 0.05. Assets = total assets; Int = foreign sales on total sales; Own diff = shares held by unknown shareholders; ROE = EBIT on equity; Lev = total debt on total assets; AIP = fixed assets on total assets; Audit exp = 1 if Big-4, 0 otherwise. Notes: The t student test on means is applied to those variables denoting a normal distribution according to the K-S test. The hypothesis is significant at 0.05. Assets = total assets; Int = foreign sales on total sales; Own diff = shares held by unknown shareholders; ROE = EBIT on equity; Lev = total debt on total assets; AIP = fixed assets on total assets; Audit exp = 1 if Big-4, 0 otherwise. Notes: ***, **, *Hypothesis of normality rejected at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level, respectively. Assets = total assets; Int = foreign sales on total sales; Own diff = shares held by unknown shareholders; ROE = EBIT on equity; Lev = total debt on total assets; AIP = fixed assets on total assets; Audit exp = 1 if Big-4, 0 otherwise. Notes: ***, **, *Hypothesis of normality rejected at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level, respectively. Assets = total assets; Int = foreign sales on total sales; Own diff = shares held by unknown shareholders; ROE = EBIT on equity; Lev = total debt on total assets; AIP = fixed assets on total assets; Audit exp = 1 if Big-4, 0 otherwise.
The logistic regression analysis
The assumptions underlying the regression model are tested for multicollinearity based on the correlation matrix and the variance inflation factor (VIF). Correlation coefficients show that LnAssets has a positive and significant association with IFRS (Table 3) . Int shows an opposite association as expected, but not significant. The Own diff shows a positive and significant correlation with IFRS as expected, which is confirmed also by the profitability even if ROE is not always significant. Lev shows a negative association with IFRS, significant in 2006 and 2007. The AIP and Audit exp have a positive influence on IFRS, but just the association with Audit exp is always significant. The correlation coefficients are lower than 0.8 and VIF never exceeds 10. This indicates that there is not a multicollinearity problem for current data. The models are significant as the percentage of correct prediction is always close to 70%, and the chi-square value is significant at 1% (Table 4) .
The LnAssets shows a positive and significant association with IFRS as expected in H1, but not significant, showing that firm size is not the main influential factor in deciding whether to apply IFRS. Contrary to our hypothesis H2, the association between Int and voluntary IFRS adoption is negative, even though not significant. The results are consistent with Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) , Francis et al. (2008) , Cameran and Campa (2010) , Bassemir (2012) , Matonti and Iuliano (2012) .
The positive and significant association between Own diff and IFRS confirms H3. Italian private firms provide additional information and allow their shareholders to control better actions of managers by facilitating the monitoring role, providing a higher disclosure and restricting accounting policy choices. Additional costs for such an increased transparency may be outweighed by the benefits gained. Our results are consistent with Francis et al. (2008) , Cameran and Campa (2010) , Bassemir (2012) , and Matonti and Iuliano (2012) . Table 3 Correlation matrix Notes: ***, **, *Spearman correlation is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level, respectively. LnAssets = natural logarithm of total assets; Int = foreign sales on total sales; Own diff = shares held by unknown shareholders; Table 3 Correlation matrix (continued) Notes: ***, **, *Spearman correlation is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level, respectively. LnAssets = natural logarithm of total assets; Int = foreign sales on total sales; Own diff = shares held by unknown shareholders; ROE = EBIT on equity; Lev = total debt on total assets; AIP = fixed assets on total assets; Audit exp = 1 if Big-4, 0 otherwise.
Table 3
Correlation matrix ( Notes: ***, **, *Spearman correlation is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level, respectively. LnAssets = natural logarithm of total assets; Int = foreign sales on total sales; Own diff = shares held by unknown shareholders; Table 4 Logistic regression results The profitability plays a positive role in influencing IFRS application, even though it is not constantly significant. This partially supports H4. Our results differ from André et al. (2013) , Matonti and Iuliano (2012) , as we face some comparability problems given the different measures of profitability. However, IFRS application is as a long-term strategic decision, and it should be taken independently from firm's profitability (Bassemir, 2012) . Lev has a negative influence on IFRS as formulated in H5, but not significant. Besides Italian firms issue greater private debt, the total debt includes smaller amounts of external debt as the major part of debt is based on equity. This could explain the lack of significance and the ratio lower than 1 on average. The AIP is positive, but it is not significant factor in explaining IFRS application. This partially supports H6. The Audit exp is positively and significantly associated to IFRS, and this supports what expected in H7. Our results demonstrate that Italy private firms are more likely to apply IFRS when they are audited by a Big-4. The results are consistent with Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) , Cameran and Campa (2010) , Bassemir (2012) , Matonti and Iuliano (2012) , André et al. (2013) .
The cross-sectional pooled results confirm the sign of each firm-specific determinant in influencing the IFRS voluntary adoption, and in particular, they show the significance of Int and AIP, not previously proved. The coefficients for all year dummies are not significant, showing any their specific role after the transition in 2006.
Conclusions
The purpose of the paper is to analyse the impact of some firm-specific characteristics on voluntary IFRS adoption by Italian private firms. Our results suggest that some selected firm-specific determinants explain the voluntary IFRS adoption. Italian private firms audited by a Big-4, with higher ownership diffusion and more profitable performance are more likely to apply voluntarily IFRS. Italian larger and more internationally diversified private firms, or more capital intensive and leveraged private firms, show a partial interest on IFRS adoption, as the influence of these firm-specific determinants is just confirmed in their expected sign.
The results of our study may be of particular interest for regulatory bodies. The debate on the financial reporting by private firms is still an ongoing project of the IASB and the FASB, as further steps have to be done for issuing a core of internationally accepted accounting standards. To this extent, our study could be a good attempt to get better and deeper insights on private firms' accounting choices. Local regulators and standard setters allowing the voluntary IFRS application in separate accounts might be also interested in this study, which could anticipate the factors influencing the potential IFRS application for SMEs. Nevertheless, research studies on financial reporting choices by private firms are scarce. This might depend on the fact that financial data and accounting choices are not available without stringent public disclosure requirements, even though such research studies have a potential and great interest.
Moreover, our paper could be a contribution to enhance the interest on IFRS voluntary adoption in Italy by providing some empirical evidence to local standard setters. Indeed, it may give primary indications if IFRS adoption could be beneficial for SMEs, as the main purpose of our study is to analyse the impact of some firm-specific characteristics on voluntary IFRS choice. Therefore, our findings may offer a direct relevance to local accounting regulators, as they may point the determinants and factors supporting and explaining IFRS adoption for SMEs.
Although this study provides insights into the firm-specific determinants of voluntary IFRS adoption, some limitations and developments for further research are drawn up. A first limitation is the lack of available data, which reduces the number of sampled firms. As pointed out by André et al. (2013) , financial data and information about accounting practices of unlisted firms are not often available without specific public disclosure requirements. A second limitation is that 90% of sampled firms are subsidiaries of a parent firm, which could influence the IFRS adoption. However, no previous studies provide findings if this may be a limit. A third limitation is that we do not analyse all the determinants of voluntary IFRS adoption, such as private equity ownership or arm's length financing, because of the lack of data (Bassemir, 2012) .
A future development of our study could be the extension of our results to other countries with similar country-specific determinants and differences of domestic GAAP vs. IFRS. Another development could be the focus on the economic consequences of IFRS adoption for private firms, as previous studies show that listed firms benefit from a lower cost of capital with greater transparency. In any case, the measurement of private firms' cost of capital is difficult owing to the limited availability of public data and absence of a public market on which cost of capital proxies are calculated. Finally, additional research could focus on a comparison of firm-specific determinants influencing voluntary IFRS adoption by private firms vs. the mandatory IFRS adoption by listed firms in Italy. Italian private firms play a fundamental role in the economic system compared to the listed ones, as they are one of the strongest components of the Italian economy. We believe it could be of some interest to investigate if some differences exist with reference to firm-specific determinants. In particular, this comparison may be repeated when the mandatory adoption of IFRS for SMEs will take place in Italy.
